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Abstract A tragedy of commons appears when the users of a common resource
have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the
situation when the tragedy of commons is embedded in a network of users and sources.
Users play a game of extractions, where they decide how much resource to draw from
each source they are connected to. We show that the network structure matters. The
exploitation at each source depends on the centrality of the links connecting the source
to the users. The equilibrium is unique and we provide a formula which expresses the
quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. Next we
characterize the efficient levels of extractions by users and outflows from sources. We
provide a graph decomposition which divides the network into regions according to
the availability of sources. Then the efficiency problem can be solved region by region.
Keywords Commons · Networks · Nash equilibrium · Efficiency ·
Centrality measures
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Since the analysis of a common property fishery by Gordon (1954) “the tragedy of the
commons” has been studied extensively.1 Though one aspect that eluded the attention
of the literature is the multiplicity of commons.
In a standard model of commons, there exists a single source exploited by many
users. In reality, the most representative commons (e.g. pastures, forests, fisheries and
sources of fresh water) are local, but numerous. The multiplicity of sources brings
new political and economic questions.
In Spain, the drought years of 2006 and 2007 resulted in a shortage of fresh water.
The efforts by the government to supply the south from the sources in the north started
a legal and political debate. Both the autonomous regions and the central government
claimed sovereignty over the sources.2 The proposed solutions involve the construc-
tion of new pipelines to transfer water and desalification plants to process sea water
for agricultural use. The rainy year of 2008 abated the problem, but water supply and
demand stay in a delicate balance at the mercy of the weather.3
The European Union implements a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) to ensure the
sustainable exploitation of the region’s living marine resources. The European Com-
mission implements conservation measures including quotas on member countries
and fishing moratoriums on particular basins. In an effort to expand the available fish-
ing basins, EU negotiates with third countries and buys access rights to fish in their
sovereign waters.4
Although a great deal is known about a single common, there exists no theoretic
model of multiple sources as exemplified above. In this paper, we will answer the two
basic questions surrounding a tragedy of commons. We will determine the equilib-
rium when the users exploit the sources freely. We will then characterize the efficient
allocation of resources.
We model a bipartite network, where links connect cities with sources. We look at
the extraction game, where agents decide how much water to draw from each source
they are connected to. The cities receive a value from consumption of the resource,
but the extraction is costly. We assume that the value of consumption is concave and
1 Levhari and Mirman (1980), Benhabib and Radner (1992), Dutta and Sundaram (1993), Dockner and
Sorger (1996) analyze the dynamic extraction of commons. Kremer and Morcom (2000), Gaudet (2002)
study the storable commons which need not be consumed upon extraction. Rowat and Dutta (2007) analyze
a common where the users have access to capital markets. On the empirical side, many real life examples
have been discussed in Ostrom (1991, 1994) and Ostrom et al. (2002). They provide both theoretical and
empirical analysis concerning possible solutions for the tragedy of the commons.
2 In addition, the better supplied north claimed the transfers would be harmful for the environment, jeop-
ardizing the quality and the sustainability of their sources, while the south pressed their urgent need for
water.
3 See Valdecantos (2005), Nash (2008) for more information on the problem and the debate.
4 See European Council (2002) for the basic regulation governing the CFP. The European Commission
provides detailed information on the implementation of the policy in its fisheries web site (http://ec.europa.
eu/fisheries).
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Fig. 1 The complete bipartite
network of two cities and two
sources
the cost of extraction at each source is a convex function of the total extraction at that
source.5
We show the extraction of a city at a source does not only depend on the number
of users she shares it with. It also depends on the number of sources their neighbors
are linked to. And also on the number of users at the sources which their neighbors
are linked to. The externalities diffuse through the paths ad infinitum. We write the
equilibrium conditions as a linear complementarity problem and show uniqueness in
Theorem 1. We interpret the equilibrium flows using the Katz–Bonacich centralities
(Katz 1953; Bonacich 1987) of the links in Theorem 3.
The complementarities in the network are between the links. The flows on two
different links are either strategic substitutes or complements. The sign of the com-
plementarity is determined by the number of nodes between them.
For example in graph g1, where c1, c2 are the cities and s1, s2 are the sources, the
flows on links 1 and 2 are strategic substitutes (Fig. 1). They both supply to c1. The
inflow from one of them decreases the marginal value of water to c1. This in turn
decreases the incentive to extract via the other link. The flows on links 1 and 3 are also
strategic substitutes. They connect s1 to c1 and c2. The outflow from one of the links
increases the marginal cost of extraction from s1. This in turn decreases the incentive
to extract via the other link. In brief, the flows on neighboring links are substitutes.
The flows on links 1 and 2 are strategic substitutes, idem the flows on links 2 and 4.
This makes the flows on links 1 and 4 complements. The extraction from one increases
the incentive to extract more from the other. The type of the complementarity between
the flows on any two links can be determined in this manner by following a path
connecting them. In general, the flows on links with an odd number of nodes between
them are strategic substitutes and the flows on links with an even number of nodes
5 The assumptions of concave value of consumption (Smith 1968; Levhari and Mirman 1980; Dutta and
Sundaram 1993; Dockner and Sorger 1996; Rowat and Dutta 2007) and convex cost of extraction (Gordon
1954; Smith 1968; Rowat and Dutta 2007) are familiar in the analysis of common property resources.
Moreover, in dynamic models where the resource propagates with time (Benhabib and Radner 1992; Dutta
and Sundaram 1993; Dockner and Sorger 1996), extraction diminishes both the current and all the future
stocks. When discounted, this leads to a convex cost.
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between them are strategic complements.6 We provide a formula which expresses the
equilibrium flows in terms of centralities of the links.
For the extraction game, a complete network of commons, where all users are
connected to all sources, is equivalent to the case of a single “big” common source
(Proposition 1). The complete networks add no complexity. At incomplete networks,
the missing links differentiate the outcome of a multiple source problem from that of a
single source. An absent link harms both the city which misses it and all the cities she
shares sources with. The shared sources are over-exploited, like in a standard tragedy
of commons. In a network, those sources which are shared by many, sparsely-con-
nected cities suffer more from over-exploitation, where as those which are shared by
few, well-connected cities fare better.
We next characterize the efficient amounts of extractions (Proposition 5). Again,
the efficient levels depend on the network. Generically, there exists a continuum of
efficient flows, which all give the same amounts of total extractions by cities and out-
flows from sources. To calculate these efficient amounts, we decompose the network
into regions (Proposition 5). Each region is a subgraph of the original network. They
are cut out from the network according to the ratio of sources to cities in them.
We do not explicitly deal with the question of management of the commons. But the
network decomposition we provide is such that in each of the subnetworks we obtain,
the problem of efficiency is equivalent to the case of one source and many users (Prop-
ositions 3 and 4). Hence with the help of our decomposition, any solution which is
proposed for the tragedy of commons7 can be applied to a network of commons.
We bridge two branches of the literature. On one side we study a tragedy of com-
mons. We extend the basic model of a common to a network of users and sources. The
symmetry between the users is lost (except for exceptional networks like the complete
network, the hub, etc.). Given a network, we show how users’ equilibrium extraction
levels and the efficient distribution of resources is determined by the network structure.
Although we use the metaphor of water, this paper differs from the literature on
sharing a river (Ambec and Sprumont 2001; Ni and Wang 2007). The sources in our
model work quite differently from a flowing river. Moreover, we do not make any
cooperative analysis of the problem.
The other related line of literature is the analysis of behavior on networks. Ballester
et al. (2006) analyzes the equilibrium activities at each node of an undirected and sim-
ple network. They show that the equilibrium levels are given by a network centrality
index, which is similar to the Katz–Bonacich centrality. Ballester and Calvó-Armengol
(2009) shows that the first order equilibrium conditions of games which exhibit cross
influences between agents’ actions are linear complementarity problems. In those two
papers, they show that it is the centralities of the nodes which determine the equilib-
rium outcomes. Our model is the first where the centralities of their links determine
the behavior of the nodes.
6 As the network is a bi-partite graph, all cycles have even length. Hence any two given links have always
either an odd or an even number of nodes between them, independent of the path.
7 See Moulin (1990), Shin and Suh (1997), Ellis and van den Nouweland (2006) for efficient mechanisms.
Seabright (1993) gives a survey of the literature on the management of the commons.
123
Networks of common property resources 109
The model we introduce can also be used to analyze Cournot competition among
firms which are linked through markets. If we think of cities as firms with quadratic
costs, and sources as markets with linear demands, the results in this paper show what
the equilibrium quantities would be in such a setup. The efficiency in our story would
be equivalent to the profit maximization of a cartel that the suppliers might form in a
network.
The basic notation, some of which we borrow from Corominas-Bosch (2004), is
introduced in Sect. 2. We define and study the extraction game in Sect. 3 and charac-
terize the efficient outcomes in Sect. 4. Section 5 discusses the results. The proofs are
given in the Appendix.
2 Notation
There are n sources s1, . . . , sn, and m cities c1, . . . , cm . They are embedded in a net-
work that links cities with sources, and cities can acquire their water from the sources
they are connected to. We will represent the network as a graph.
A non-directed bipartite graph g = 〈S ∪ C, L〉 consists of a set of nodes formed
by sources S = {s1, . . . , sn}, and cities C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a set of links L , each
link joining a source with a city. A link from si to c j will be denoted as (i, j). We
say that a source si is linked to a city c j if there is a link joining the two. We will use
(i, j) ∈ g meaning that si and c j are connected in g. Let r(g) be the number of links
in g.
A graph g is connected if there exists a path linking any two nodes of the graph.
Formally, a path linking nodes si and c j will be a collection of t cities and t sources,
t ≥ 0, s1, . . . st , c1, . . . , ct among S ∪ C (possibly some of them repeated) such that
(i, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (t, t), (t, j) ∈ g
A subgraph g0 = 〈S0 ∪ C0, L0〉 of g is a graph such that S0 ⊆ S, C0 ⊆ C, L0 ⊆ L
and such that each link in L that connects a source in S0 with a city in C0 is a member
of L0. Hence a node of g0 will continue to have the same links it had with the other
nodes in g0. We will write g0 ⊆ g to mean that g0 is a subgraph of g. For a subgraph
g0 of g, we will denote by g − g0, the subgraph of g that results when we remove the
set of nodes S0 ∪ C0 from g.
Given a subgraph g0 = 〈S0 ∪ C0, L0〉 of g, let ←→g0 be the complete bipartite graph
with nodes S0 ∪ C0. We call ←→g0 the completed graph of g0.
We will denote by Ng(si ) the set of cities linked with si in g = 〈S ∪ C, L〉 , more
formally:
Ng(si ) = {c j ∈ C such that (i, j) ∈ g}
and similarly Ng(c j ) stands for the set of sources linked with c j .
For a set A, let |A| denote the number of elements in A.
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3 The extraction game
Given a graph g, each city c j maximizes her utility by extracting a non-negative
amount of water through its links from the sources in Ng(c j ). So, the set of players
are the set of cities C .
We denote by qi j ≥ 0 the amount of water extracted by city c j from source si .
Now we define the column vector that shows the quantities flowing at each link.
Given a graph g, let Qg be the column vector of quantities extracted. Hence Qg is the
link by link profile of extractions and has size r(g).

















In the vector Qg , the flow qi j is listed above the flow qkl when j < l or when j = l
and i < k. We will make use of graphs g1 and g2 in many examples throughout the
paper.
Let Qr be the set of all non-negative real valued column vectors of size r . Given a
vector of flows Qg , for a city c j , we will denote by q j the total amount extracted by
c j . For a source si we will denote by qi the total outflow from si .
The set of strategies of a city c j is Q j . We denote a representative strategy of c j
by Q j ∈ Q j . Given that there are r(g) links in g, the strategy space of the game is
Qg = ∏c j ∈C Q j = Qr(g). We denote a representative strategy profile on a graph g
by Qg ∈ Qg .
The utility of city c j is u j (Qg). We will assume that the utility functions of players
are additively separable into a concave value and a convex cost of extraction. We will
use quadratic value and cost functions, which will decrease the computational load
and help us focus on the effects of the network structure. For a given Qg ∈ Qr , for
α, β, γ > 0,
Fig. 2 Two different networks of two cities and two sources
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si ∈Ng(c j )
qi j qi
The first two terms give the value of total extraction.
v j (q j ) = αq j − γ2 q
2
j
The marginal value of extraction is a linear and strictly decreasing function of q j . The
parameter γ is the slope of the marginal value.
The third term in the utility function is the cost of extraction summed over the
sources connected to c j . We assume that at each si , the cost of extraction is a convex
quadratic function
Ti (Qg) = βq2i
and assume that each player pays her share of the cost proportional to her extraction.
Hence, the cost of extraction qi j by c j from si is
Ti j (Qg) = βqi j qi
The utility function, although separable in terms of the value and the cost of extraction,
u j (Qg) = v j (q j ) −
∑
si ∈Ng(c j )
Ti j (Qg)
is not separable with respect to each source. The marginal utility from qi j does depend
on the amounts extracted by c j from sources other than si .
The best response Q′j of city c j to Qg ∈ Qg is such that,
for all links (i, j), q ′i j =
⎧⎨
⎩
α−γ ∑sl ∈Ng (c j )\{si } ql j −β
∑
ck∈Ng (si )\{c j } qik
2β+γ , if
∂u j
∂qi j |Qg ≥ 0
0, if ∂u j
∂qi j |Qg < 0
(1)
Given a matrix M ∈ Rt×t and a vector p ∈ Rt , the linear complementarity problem
LC P(p; M) consists of finding a vector z ∈ Rt satisfying
z ≥ 0,
p + Mz ≥ 0,
zT (p + Mz) ≥ 0
Samelson (1958) shows that a linear complementarity problem LC P(p; M) has a
unique solution for all p ∈ Rt if and only if all the principal minors of M are positive.
Given a graph g, the first order equilibrium conditions of the extraction game form
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a linear complementarity problem where z = Qg, p = −α1r(g), where 1r(g) is a
vector of 1’s of size r(g) and M is the square matrix of the linear system of equations
formed by the best response functions of users.8 This matrix will be formally defined
in the Appendix before the proofs. We prove that it is positive-definite, hence there
exists a unique solution.
We further check for the second order conditions for the agents, which reveal that
the solution of the linear complementarity problem is indeed the equilibrium of the
game.
Theorem 1 The extraction game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Example 1 Suppose we have graph g1. Let α = β = γ = 1. Then the link flows at
equilibrium9 are q∗11 = q∗21 = q∗12 = q∗22 = 0.2.
Suppose the graph was g2. Now at equilibrium, q∗11 = 0.2857, q∗21 = 0.1429, and
q∗22 = 0.2857. The deletion of the link (1, 2) changes the extraction levels. Now c2 is
connected only to s2 and exploits it more. This makes the extractions from s2 more
costly and c1 extracts less from this source. Instead, c1 relies more on her exclusive
connection s1 where the extraction is less costly.
Let Q∗g be an equilibrium of the extraction game. There might be some links in g
which carry zero flow at equilibrium Q∗g . Marginal utilities of extractions from those
links need not be zero at Q∗g .








To calculate the equilibrium quantities, first we need to weed out the links with zero
flow. We denote by g − Z(Q∗g) the graph obtained from g by deleting the links which
have zero flow at Q∗g .
Theorem 2 Given two graphs g and g′. Let Q∗g and Q∗g′ be the equilibrium of
the extraction game in g and g′, respectively. If g − Z(Q∗g) = g′ − Z(Q∗g′), then
Q∗g−Z(Q∗g) = Q∗g′−Z(Q∗g′ ).
At equilibrium there might be links which carry no flows. For the cities of such
links, the marginal utilities of extraction through them are not positive. They are indif-
ferent between having such a link or not. Theorem 2 tells us such links play no role in
determining the equilibrium. They are strategically redundant. Take graph g3 (Fig. 3).
Let α = β = γ = 1. Then at equilibrium,
Now we cut the link (1, 3) and denote the new graph by g3 − (1, 3) (Fig. 4).
For α = β = γ = 1, according to Theorem 2 the flows at equilibrium in both
graphs are q∗11 = q∗12 = 14 and q∗23 = q∗33 = 14 . At the equilibrium in g3, the marginal
8 The matrix is formed by the upper part of the conditional equations as given in (1).
9 The calculations are given in the Appendix.
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Fig. 3 A link carries zero flows
at equilibrium
Fig. 4 Deletion of the zero flow
link does not affect other flows
utility to c3 from extraction via (1, 3) was negative. Deleting it does not change the
equilibrium quantities on other links, because the marginal utility on them is the same
as in graph g3.
We will use the marginal utility argument employed above to give a network inter-
pretation for the flows at equilibrium. Given a graph g, we will calculate the equilibrium
at graph g − Z(Q∗g). By Theorem 2, this gives us the equilibrium flows in g for the
links which carry positive quantities and the equilibrium flows on the rest of the links
in g are zero.
Definition 1 Given a graph g, a line graph L(g) of g is a graph obtained by denoting
each link in g with a node in L(g) and connecting two nodes in L(g) if and only if
the corresponding links in g meet at one endpoint.
For the graph g, the line graph10 L(g) represents the adjacencies between the links
in g.
For graph g with k nodes, the k-square adjacency matrix represents which nodes
are connected to which other nodes in g. To calculate the equilibrium flows, we will
use the adjacency matrix of the line graph L(g− Z(Q∗g)) of the graph g− Z(Q∗g). This
adjacency matrix keeps track of the connections between the links of the network.




Given a graph g, let G∗ be the weighted adjacency matrix of the line graph of
g − Z(Q∗g) such that the links which are connected via a city have weight γ and the
links which are connected via a source have weight β. The columns and the rows
in G∗ correspond to the links in g − Z(Q∗g). If the two links share a city, then the
corresponding entry is γ . If they share a source, then it is β. For example for graph g2









For any graph g, G∗ has diagonal entries as 0 and non-diagonal entries are either
0, γ or β. We will use G∗ to denote both the line graph of g− Z(Q∗g) and the weighted
adjacency matrix of this graph.
For a ≥ 0, and a network adjacency matrix G∗, let




If M(G∗, a) is non-negative, its entries mi j (G∗, a)counts the number of paths in the
network, starting at node i and ending at node j , where paths of length k are weighted
by ak .
Definition 2 For a network adjacency matrix G, and for scalar a > 0 such that
M(G, a) = [I − aG]−1 is well-defined and non-negative, the vector Katz–Bonacich
centralities of parameter a in G is:
b(G, a) = [I − aG]−1 .1
In a graph with z nodes, the Katz–Bonacich centrality of node i ,
bi (G, a) =
z∑
j=1
mi j (G, a)
counts the total number of paths in G starting from i.











where a = 12β+γ .
The first summation counts the total number of even paths that start from the corre-
sponding node in G∗, and the second summation counts the total number of odd paths
that start from it.
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The first sum tells that the equilibrium extraction from a link is positively related
with the number of even length paths that start from it. The flows on links which have
an even number of nodes between them are complements. In contrast, the negative
sign on the second summation means the equilibrium extraction from a link is neg-
atively related with the number of odd length paths that start from it. The flows on
the links which have an odd number of nodes between them are strategic substitutes.
This effect of parity in length stems from the fact that all neighboring link flows are
substitutes. This makes the flows on links which have a distance of two between them
complements. The sign of strategic interaction between the link flows is reversed as
the path length between them increases by one.
In the adjacency matrix G∗ each link has a weight. While counting the number of
paths, these weights are taken into account. The extraction by a city c j is calculated
by summing up the quantities on the links in Ng(c j ). The outflow from a source si is
calculated by summing up the quantities on the links in Ng(si ).
Now we determine a benchmark to demonstrate the effect of the network structure
in the game of extractions.
Proposition 1 Let g be a complete bipartite network with n sources and m cities,
with the corresponding parameters α, β, γ > 0. Let g′ be the network with a single
source and m cities with parameters α, β
n
, γ > 0. Let Qg and Qg′ be the equilibrium
of the extraction game in g and g′, respectively. Then the equilibrium consumptions
and payoffs in Qg and Qg′ are the same for all cities in g and g′.
Proposition 1 establishes the equivalence between a complete bipartite network with
multiple sources and a simple commons problem with a single source. The sources
in a complete network can be viewed as a single big source. A complete network
adds no complexity to the original problem of commons. At incomplete networks the
deviations from this benchmark will be due to the structure of the connections.
For example, in graph g3, where α = β = γ = 1, the equilibrium consumptions
and utilities of the cities are























In the completed graph of g3, the equilibrium consumptions and utilities would have
been
(


























The decrease in c1’s and c2’s consumptions and utilities are due to their lack of links
in comparison to the complete network and c3 benefits as she no longer shares two of
the sources with others.
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4 The efficient extraction
Assuming that cities have comparable and identical utilities, we will define efficiency
as the maximization of the total welfare. But the techniques we introduce can be used
to determine the optimal distribution of resources under other possible definitions of
efficiency like maximin or weighted utilitarian welfare.11





u j (Qg) = α
∑
(i, j)∈g









First, we will characterize the efficient flow vectors in Proposition 2. In a complete
bipartite network of commons, due to its symmetry, it is easy to calculate the efficient
extractions. We next establish that for a class of networks of commons, the efficient
extractions are equal to those in their completed graphs (Propositions 3 and 4). In
Proposition 5, we provide a network decomposition to calculate the efficient extrac-
tions. Proposition 6 reveals that at equilibrium the sources are exploited more than the
efficient level.
Proposition 2 Given a graph g, the flow vector Qg is efficient if and only if
for all (i, j) ∈ g
{
if qi j = 0, then α = γ q j + 2βqi
if qi j = 0, then α < γ q j + 2βqi
The conditions in Proposition 2 are the first order conditions for efficiency. Since
the utility functions are strictly concave in extractions, efficiency is achieved when
the resources are distributed as equally as possible within the graph g. This means
smoothing out of both, extractions among sources, and consumptions among cities.
If Qeg is a vector of efficient flows, then for a city c j and any two different sources
si , sk ∈ Ng(c j )
qei j , q
e
k j = 0 ⇒ qei = qek
qei j = 0 and qek j = 0 ⇒ qei > qek
11 See ˙Ilkılıç and Kayı (2010) where the techniques we use to calculate efficiency are adopted to determine
the outcomes of several allocation rules for a bankruptcy problem on a network.
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Similarly, for a source si and any two different cities c j , cl ∈ Ng(si )
qei j , q
e
il = 0 ⇒ qej = qel
qei j = 0 and qeil = 0 ⇒ qej > qel
We are not guaranteed a unique solution. Indeed, we will see that, in general, there
exists a continuum of solutions to the problem of efficient flows. But all efficient flows
will lead to the same total extraction for each city and the same total outflow from
each source.









21 ≥ 0 : qe11 + qe12 =
1
3
, qe21 + qe22
= 1
3
, qe11 + qe21 =
1
3




There exists a continuum of flows which give an efficient outcome. The total extrac-
tions at each city and the total outflows at each source are the same for all the efficient
flow levels.
Now we will find a vector of extractions that satisfies the first order conditions of
efficiency. Given a subgraph g0 = 〈S0 ∪ C0, L0〉 of g, consider the efficient amount
of extractions and outflows in its completed graph ←→g0 . Clearly the levels are identical
across cities and across sources. Let ←−q0 be the efficient amount of total extraction by
a city in ←→g0 and −→q0 the efficient amount of total outflow from a source in ←→g0 . If
|S0| = n0 and |C0| = m0, then direct calculation shows that
←−q0 = αn0
γ n0 + 2βm0 and
−→q0 = αm0
γ n0 + 2βm0 .
These values depend only on the source/city ratio. For two graphs g0 = 〈S0 ∪C0, L0〉





←−q0 = ←−q1 and −→q0 = −→q1 .
We will use the efficient levels of the complete graph as benchmarks while calculating
the efficient amounts at incomplete bipartite graphs.
Given g, we say that a flow vector Qg is feasible if all flows in Qg are non-nega-
tive.The set of feasible flow vectors in g0 is a subset of the set of feasible flow vectors
in its completed graph ←→g0 . Then given efficient levels of extraction ←−q0 and outflow−→q0 at ←→g0 , if these amounts are possible in g0, then they must be efficient for g0 also.
Proposition 3 Let g0 = 〈S0 ∪ C0, L0〉 be a subgraph of g. If the extraction of ←−q0 by
each city in C0 is possible without exceeding the outflow −→q0 in any source in S0, then
these levels are efficient in g0.
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Fig. 5 Inclusive subgraph
To calculate the efficient flows we need to introduce new graph theoretical defini-
tions.





An inclusive subgraph12 includes all the sources to which its cities were connected
in graph g. Let W (g) = {g0 ⊆ g : g0 is inclusive} be the set of inclusive subgraphs
in g. Since g is an inclusive subgraph of itself W (g) = ∅. In graph g3 in Fig. 5, the
subgraph g03 that we encircle is inclusive. It includes c1 and all the sources that c1 is
connected to.
Given a subset of sources S0 ⊆ S and a subset of cities C0 ⊆ C, |S0||C0| is the average










The first requirement for ĝ to be a least inclusive subgraph of g is for it to have a
strictly smaller source/city ratio than g. This means that a graph does not necessarily
have a least inclusive subgraph. For example a complete bipartite graph has no least
inclusive subgraphs. The second requirement is for ĝ to have the smallest source/city
ratio among the inclusive subgraphs of g. A least inclusive subgraph is inclusive and
formed by a set of the least connected cities. There should be no cities in g which are
strictly worse than them with respect to source availability.
In Fig. 5, the subgraph g03 is not least inclusive, because the ratio of sources to cities
in it is 1. This ratio for graph g3 is also 1. The subgraph g13 of g3, as encircled Fig. 6,
is a least inclusive subgraph. Its source/city ratio is lower than that of g3, and there is
no other inclusive subgraph of g3 with a lower ratio.
12 See Bochet et al. (2009) for the relation between inclusive subgraphs and the Gallai–Edmonds decom-
position (Ore 1962) of a bipartite network.
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Fig. 6 Least inclusive subgraph
If ĝ is a least inclusive subgraph of g, then ĝ cannot have a least inclusive subgraph
of its own. Any inclusive subgraph of ĝ is also inclusive in g. If ĝ had a least inclusive
subgraph with a smaller source/city ratio than ĝ, this would have contradicted ĝ having
the smallest source/city ratio in g.
Now we show that if a subgraph g0 = 〈S0 ∪ C0, L0〉 of g has no least inclusive
subgraph, then the extraction of ←−q0 by each city in C0 is possible without exceeding
the outflow −→q0 in any source in S0
Proposition 4 Let g0 = 〈S0∪C0, L0〉 of g be an inclusive subgraph. If g0 has no least
inclusive subgraph, then the extraction of ←−q0 by each city in C0 is possible without
exceeding the outflow −→q0 in any source in S0.
The result means that from an efficiency perspective, if a network of commons has
no least inclusive subgraph, it can be treated as a complete network. All the agents are
symmetric under efficiency. Hence there is no difference between this problem and
the simple tragedy of the commons with a single source. Any solution or mechanism
that remedies the latter would solve the tragedy of the commons in a network with no
least inclusive subgraph.
We prove Proposition 4 by induction on the number of cities. We start with a city
c j of a graph g0 with no inclusive subgraphs. This city must be able to extract ←−q0 ,
without exceeding the outflow −→q0 in any of its sources. If not, that city with its sources
would have formed a least inclusive subgraph in g0. Next, we add a new city to this
subgraph and iteratively show that such extractions must be possible for all inclusive
subgraphs of g0 that contain c j . As g0 is an inclusive subgraph of itself, this proves
that such extractions are possible in g0.
Decomposing the network. Now we will break down the network of commons g, so
that the commons problem in each subnetwork is independent from the other ones. We
will sequentially cut out least inclusive subgraphs. Hence, they will not have any least
inclusive subgraphs of their own. We will continue until we reach a subgraph which
has no least inclusive subgraphs. Then in each subgraph, the efficient amounts of total
extractions at each city and total outflows at each source will be equal to the efficient




Proposition 5 Given a network of commons g, the following algorithm calculates the
efficient levels of extractions by each city and outflows from each source.
Step 1: Take g. Suppose g = 〈S ∪ C, L〉 has no least inclusive subgraph. Then the
efficient total extraction by a city c j and the efficient total outflow from a source si
are equal to the efficient levels in a complete bipartite graph with nodes S ∪ C, and
we are done.
Suppose g = 〈S ∪ C, L〉 has a least inclusive subgraph. Let g0 = 〈S0 ∪ C0, L0〉 be
the largest least inclusive subgraph13 in g. Then, the efficient total extraction by a
city c j ∈ C0 is ←−q0 , and the efficient total extraction from a source si ∈ S0 is −→q0 .
Step 2: Now, for the rest of the cities and sources apply Step 1 to g − g0.
In this way we obtain a series of regions out of g, with a strictly increasing source
per city ratio. In each of them, the efficient levels of extractions would equal to the
levels in their respective completed graphs.
So, given a subgraph g0 = 〈S0 ∪ C0, L0〉 obtained from the above decomposition,
the efficient extraction by a city in g0 is
←−q0 = αn0
γ n0 + 2βm0
and the efficient outflow from each source in g0 is
−→q0 = αm0
γ n0 + 2βm0
These levels satisfy the first order conditions within each region. Moreover, less
resourceful regions have lower amounts of extractions by cities and higher amounts
of outflows from sources. Since there are no flows between different regions the first
order conditions hold for graph g as well.
The link redundancies reappear while calculating efficiency. Take two graphs g
and g′ such that their decomposition yields the same regions. The efficient amounts
of total extractions at each city and total outflows at each source are the same for both
g and g′.
Efficiency versus equilibrium
If each source were used by a single user, then clearly the Nash equilibrium would
be efficient. But when sources are shared, they would be exploited above the efficient
levels.
Proposition 6 If there are shared sources, then at equilibrium users extract more than
the efficient extraction levels.
Example 3 Suppose we have graph g3. Let α = β = γ = 1. The decomposition
would give us two regions, g13 and g3 − g13. Then the efficient flows are
13 The ratio |Ng(C0)||C0| is a submodular function of C0, where Ng(C0) is the set of sources connected to C0.
Then at any graph g, there exists a unique largest least inclusive subgraph.
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Suppose the graph was g3 − (1, 3). The decomposition leads to the same regions.





















The link (1, 3) is redundant from an efficiency point of view, just as it was for equi-
librium. The levels of extractions are below the equilibrium for s1, which is shared by
c1 and c2 and equal to the equilibrium for s2 and s3, which are used only by c3.
5 Discussion
We have analyzed a situation where the tragedy of commons is embedded in a net-
work. We showed that there is a unique equilibrium. This result would hold under less
restrictive assumptions on value and cost functions. It would have required the first
order conditions to be written as a general(not necessarily linear) complementarity
problem. Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for a unique solution to this problem. These conditions can be translated to our setting
as “stronger” convexity requirements on the utility functions of cities.14
The quadratic cost and value functions, although restrictive, help us focus on the
effects of the network on equilibrium. They allow us to formulate the equilibrium
quantities in terms of a well-known network centrality index. The quantity flowing
through a link is determined by even length and odd length paths starting from it. This
effect of parity in length would continue to hold for more general payoff functions, as
long as all neighboring link flows are strategic substitutes.
Our analysis paves way for further research. Since the equilibrium is unique, it
is possible to study an endogenous network formation game for commons, based on
comparative statics. The users in regions with scarce resources would have an incen-
tive to connect to less exploited sources in the network. Another interesting issue is
the dynamic exploitation in a network of commons where extractions affect the future
availability of the resource. In the static model users depend less on the “crowded”
sources. In a dynamic model users might run on such sources before their depletion,
aggravating inefficiency.
Appendix
We first need to introduce additional notation for the proofs.
14 An example is Nava (2008) which studies quantity competition in a network of Walrasian agents. With
the help of Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987), he provides sufficient conditions on the Jacobians of agents’
utility functions for the uniqueness of equilibrium.
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Labeling of pairs (i, j)
We will order all possible links such that the links of a city c j are assigned a lower
number than any city ci for i > j , and the links of a city are ordered according to
the indices of the sources they come from. The label of a possible link (i, j) will be
denoted by τ(i, j). For example for 2 cities and 2 sources, we will order the links
starting from the first city and the first source, τ(1, 1) = 1. The second link is between
the first city and the second source, τ(2, 1) = 2. Now, as all links of city c1 are ranked,
τ will next rank the link between c2 and s1, τ (1, 2) = 3. Then comes the link between
city c2 and source s2, τ (2, 2) = 4 (Fig. 7).
For a network g, let Y (g) = {1 ≤ y ≤ (n×m) : y = τ(i, j) for some (i, j) /∈ g} be
the set of indices that τ assigns to links which are not in g. For 2 cities and 2 sources,
for a graph g, if the only missing link is (1, 2), then Y (g) = {3} and r(g) = 3.
τ orders all possible links, independent of g, where as Y (g) does depend on g. We
can see how this works on an example. Suppose that 2 cities and 2 sources, form a
completely connected bipartite graph g1. For graph g1, Y (g1) = ∅.
If we cut the link between c2 and s1, to obtain g2, although link (1, 2) does not exist
in g2 it is still labeled equally by τ . τ(1, 2) = 3, meaning that Y (g2) = {3}.
Let N+ be the set of positive integers. Let ρ : L → N+ be a lexicographic order
on L respecting τ such that ρ relabels the (i, j) pairs from 1 to r(g) by skipping those
links which are not in g.
Explicitly, ρ : L → N+ is such that:
(i) ∃(i, j) ∈ g such that ρ(i, j) = 1,
(ii) (i, j) = (k, l) ⇒ ρ(i, j) = ρ(k, l),
(iii) j < l ⇒ ρ(i, j) < ρ(k, l) for all (i, j), (k, l) ∈ g,
(iv) i < k ⇒ ρ(i, j) < ρ(k, j) for all (i, j), (k, j) ∈ g,
(v) if ∃(i, j) s.t. ρ(i, j) = z > 1 then ∃(k, l) ∈ g s.t. ρ(k, l) = y − 1.
Let Z(Qg) = {1 ≤ z ≤ r(g) : z = ρ(i, j) for some (i, j) s.t. qi j = 0}. Let
|Z(Qg)| = t , then Qg−Z(Qg) is a vector of size r(g)− t obtained from Qg by deleting
the zero entries. It is the vector of quantities for links over which there is a strictly
positive flow.
Let Q∗g be the equilibrium of the extraction game at network g. We denote by
g − Z(Q∗g) the network obtained from g by deleting the links which have zero flow
Fig. 7 Labeling the links
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at Q∗g . Let r∗(g) = r(g) − t . Let G∗ = [pi j ]r∗(g)×r∗(g) be the weighted adjacency




γ, if ρ−1(i) and ρ−1( j) share a city
β, if ρ−1(i) and ρ−1( j) share a source
0, otherwise
Some useful matrices
Now we define some matrices which we will use in the proofs. We will first introduce
auxiliary matrices A, B, B. These will help us construct the matrices D and F . We will
use matrices D and F to write the first order conditions for equilibrium and efficiency,
respectively, as linear complementarity problems.
For β, γ ≥ 0, let A = [ai j ]n×n be such that,
ai j =
{
2β + γ, for i = j
γ, for i = j












Let B = β In×n , where In×n is the identity matrix of size n. Using matrices A and B,

















2β + γ, for i = j
γ, for i = j, s.t. (i, j) = (z1n + z2, z1n + z3) for z1, z2, z3 ∈ N
s.t. z2 = z3, 1 ≤ z2, z3 ≤ n − 1 and z1 ≤ m − 1
β, for i = j , s.t. i + j = (1 + z1)n + 1 + 2z2, for z1, z2 ∈ N








2β + γ γ β 0
γ 2β + γ 0 β
β 0 2β + γ γ
0 β γ 2β + γ
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
The interpretation, when we use it to find the equilibrium quantities flowing from
sources to cities, will be that the column z and the row z in D corresponds to the
link (i, j) in g such that τ(i, j) = z. Hence, column 1 and row 1 corresponds to the
link (1, 1), column 2 and row 2 corresponds to the link (2, 1), column 3 and row 3
corresponds to the link (1, 2), and column 4 and row 4 corresponds to the link (2, 2).
Let D− j be the matrix obtained by deleting row j and column j from D. For
J ⊂ N+, let D−J be the matrix obtained by deleting each row j ∈ J and column
j ∈ J from D. We will denote D−Y (g) by Dg . We obtain Dg by deleting each row
y ∈ Y (g) and column y ∈ Y (g) from D. These rows and columns belong to links that
are not in g. Then, Dg has size r(g) × r(g).
For g2, as Y (g2) = {3}, Dg2 is formed by taking out the third column and third




2β + γ γ 0
γ 2β + γ β
0 β 2β + γ
⎤
⎦
Let B = 2B be the matrix obtained from B by multiplying it with the scalar 2.

















2β + γ, for i = j
γ, for i = j, s.t. (i, j) = (z1n + z2, z1n + z3) for z1, z2, z3 ∈ N
s.t. z2 = z3, 1 ≤ z2, z3 ≤ n − 1 and z1 ≤ m − 1
2β, for i = j , s.t. i + j = (1 + z1)n + 1 + 2z2, for z1, z2 ∈ N
s.t. z1 ≤ m − 1, z2 ≤ m
0, otherwise
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2β + γ γ 2β 0
γ 2β + γ 0 2β
2β 0 2β + γ γ
0 2β γ 2β + γ
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
Similarly, let F− j be the matrix obtained by deleting row j and column j from F .
For J ⊂ N+, let F−J be the matrix obtained by deleting each row j ∈ J and column
j ∈ J from F . We will denote F−Y (g) by Fg . We obtain Fg by deleting each row
y ∈ Y (g) and column y ∈ Y (g) from F. These rows and columns belong to links that
are not in g. Then, Fg has size r(g) × r(g).





2β + γ γ 0
γ 2β + γ 2β
0 2β 2β + γ
⎤
⎦
We show that for β, γ > 0, Dg is positive definite, and Fg is positive semi-definite
for any network g. These results (Propositions 7 and 8) will be used in the proofs of
Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, respectively.
Proposition 7 For β, γ > 0, Dg is positive definite for any network g.
Proof of Proposition 7 Let g has n sources, m cities and r(g) links. We show that for
the matrix Dg we can find a matrix Rg with independent columns such that Dg =
RTg Rg .15 We will write columns of Rg so that the entries in Dg appear in square roots




2β + γ γ 0
γ 2β + γ β
0 β 2β + γ
⎤
⎦
























15 This is equivalent to checking that Dg is positive definite. For other characterizations of positive
definiteness see Strang (1988).
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Then clearly Dg3 = (Rg3)T Rg3 . Now, we generalize this to all possible Dg .
For si in S, we denote |Ng(si )| by mi (g). Similarly for c j ∈ C, let |Ng(c j )| =
n j (g), be the number of sources connected to c j .









, for i = j,
s.t. (i, j) = (∑0≤k<z1 nk(g) + r(g) + z2,
∑
0≤k<z1 nk(g) + z3)




, for i = j ,
s.t. (i, j) = (∑0≤k<z1 mk(g) + z2 + 2r(g),
∑k=z3
k=0 mz3(g) + 1),
for z1, z2, z3 ∈ N s.t. 1 ≤ z1, z3 ≤ m, and 1 ≤ z2 ≤ mz1(g)
0, otherwise
Let Kg = β Ir(g)×r(g), for i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and Li =
√
γ
ni (g)1ni (g), where 1 is the square







, for i = j ,
s.t. (i, j) = (∑0≤k<z1 mk(g) + z2, z1 + 1), for z1, z2 ∈ N
s.t. 1 ≤ z1 ≤ m, and 1 ≤ z2 ≤ mz1(g)
0, otherwise














As Kg is a diagonal matrix of size r(g), the row space of Rg has dimension r(g),
meaning that the column space also has dimension r(g). Then the columns of Rg are
linearly independent. It is straight forward to check that Dg =
(
Rg
)T Rg . unionsq
Proposition 8 For β, γ > 0, Fg is positive semi-definite for any network g.
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Proof of Proposition 8 The matrix Fg has size r(g) × r(g). Now, let Rg =







, for i = j,
s.t. (i, j) = (∑0≤k<z1 nk(g) + r(g) + z2,
∑
0≤k<z1 nk(g) + z3)




, for i = j ,
s.t. (i, j) = (∑0≤k<z1 mk(g) + z2 + 2r(g),
∑k=z3
k=0 mz3(g) + 1),





ni (g)1ni (g), where 1 is the square matrix of 1’s. For k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we







, for i = j ,
s.t. (i, j) = (∑0≤k<z1 mk(g) + z2, z1 + 1), for z1, z2 ∈ N
s.t. 1 ≤ z1 ≤ m, and 1 ≤ z2 ≤ mz1(g)
0, otherwise


















Proof of Theorem 1 Given a graph g, the equilibrium conditions of the game is a
LC P(−α1r ; Dg), where 1 is a column vector of 1’s of size r .
Qg ≥ 0,
−α1r + Dg Qg ≥ 0,
QTg (q + Dg Qg) ≥ 0
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Samelson (1958) shows that a linear complementarity problem LC P(p; M) has a
unique solution for all p ∈ Rt if and only if all the principal minors of M are positive.
Positive definite matrices satisfy this condition and we showed in Proposition 7 that Dg
is positive definite. Then the first order equilibrium conditions have a unique solution.
Let us check the second order condition. For city ck , denote the Hessian matrix of
the utility uk by Huk = [hi j ]nk(g)×nk(g) such that
hi j=
{−2β − γ, for i = j
−γ, for i = j .
We will show that for any z ∈ N+, the matrix Hz = [hi j ]z×z such that
hi j =
{−2β − γ, for i = j
−γ, for i = j
is negative definite.
Let Hz = −(2β + γ )H ′z, where H ′z = [h′i j ]z×z is such that,
h′i j =
{
1, for i = j
φ, for i = j , where φ =
γ
2β + γ
If we denote the determinant of Hz by Det (Hz), then
Det (Hz) = (2β + γ )(−1)n Det (H ′z).
Now, we show by induction that for all z ∈ N+, Det (H ′z) > 0.
For z = 1, Det (H ′1) = 2β + α > 0. Assume Det (H ′z−1) > 0.
Det (H ′z) = Det
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 φ · · · φ
φ 1 · · · ·
· · · ·
· · · ·
· · · ·







1 + (n − 2)φ
)
Det (H ′z−1)
Then, Hz is negative definite and the extraction game with quadratic values has a
unique Nash equilibrium. unionsq
Calculations of Example 1 Suppose we have graph g1. Then
u1(Qg1) = (q11 + q21) −
(q11 + q21)2
2
− q11(q11 + q12) − q21(q21 + q22)
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Deriving with respect to q11 gives
∂u1
∂q11
= 1 − 3q11 − q21 − q12 = 0
Due to the symmetry of graph g1, q∗11 = q∗21 = q∗12 = q∗22 = 0.2. Suppose we have
graph g2. Then,
u1(Qg2) = (q11 + q21) −
(q11 + q21)2
2
− q211 − q21(q21 + q22)
and
u2(Qg2) = q22 −
q222
2
− q22(q21 + q22)
Deriving u1 with respect to q11, q21 and u2 with respect to q22 gives
∂u1
∂q11
= 1 − 3q11 − q21 = 0
∂u1
∂q21
= 1 − 3q21 − q11 − q22 = 0
∂u2
∂q22
= 1 − 3q22 − q21 = 0
Solution of the linear equations gives q∗11 = 0.2857 , q∗21 = 0.1429, and q∗22 = 0.2857.
Proof of Theorem 2 Assume Q∗g−Z(Qg), Q∗g−Z(Q′′g) are equilibria of the game at g and
g′, respectively. Let g − Z(Q∗g) = g′ − Z(Q∗g′). Then we can write,
Dg−Z(Q∗g).Q∗g−Z(Q∗g) = α.1 = Dg′−Z(Q∗g′ ).Q
∗
g′−Z(Q∗g′ ) = Dg−Z(Q∗g).Q
∗
g′−Z(Q∗g′ ).
As we showed in Proposition 7 Dg−Z(Q∗g) is positive definite, hence invertible.
Q∗g−Z(Qg) = Q∗g−Z(Q′′g).
unionsq
Proof of Theorem 3 We will calculate the equilibrium flows for the networks
g − Z(Q∗g). By Theorem 2, these are equal to the equilibrium flows in g for the links
which carry positive flows. The rest of the links in g carry zero flows in equilibrium.









(2β + γ )I + G∗] .Q∗g−Z(Q∗g)
= (2β + γ ) [I + aG∗] .Q∗g−Z(Q∗g)
where a = 12β+γ . Remember that Q∗g is the solution to LC P(−α1r ; Dg). Then, when
we invert Dg−Z(Q∗g), the matrix multiplication α.[Dg−Z(Q∗g)]−11 will give us a strictly
positive vector. Now, for a ≥ 0,
[






































Proof of Proposition 1 In g, the utility of c j is
u j (Qg) = α
∑
si ∈S












Then for any link (i, j), qi j = αnγ+(m+1)β . For any c j , q j = nqi j = αγ+(m+1) β
n
.
In g′, the utility of c′j is









Then, q1 j = α
γ+(m+1) βn
. Hence, the total consumption by a city is the same in both g
and g′.
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meaning that the utility of a city in g is equal to that of a city in g′. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 The first order condition that an efficient vector of flows Qeg
has to satisfy is,
for all (i, j) ∈ g
{ if qei j = 0, then α = γ qej + 2βqei
if qei j = 0, then α < γ qej + 2βqei
Observe that this is also a linear complementarity problem with LC P(−α1r ; Fg). Fg
is positive semi-definite. Hence, LC P(−α1r ; Fg) has a solution, though not neces-
sarily unique.
The Hessian matrix of U is HU = −Fg. By Proposition 8, Fg is positive semi-def-
inite. Hence, HU is negative semi-definite. Meaning that any Qg that satisfies the first
order conditions maximizes U . unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 We know that the extraction of ←−q0 and the outflow −→q0 satisfies
the first order conditions in ←→g0 . Since g0 and ←→g0 have the same set of nodes, they
also satisfy the conditions in g0. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 By assumption, g0 has no least inclusive subgraphs.
Take a city c j in g0. Let c j extract a total of ←−q0 , such that none of the sources supply
more than −→q0 . ←−q0 and −→q0 are functions of the source/city ratio. If c j is not linked to
enough sources to achieve such an extraction, then city c j and the sources Ng(c j )
form a least inclusive subgraph in g0, which is a contradiction with g0 having no least
inclusive subgraphs.
Now, we are going to show by induction that ←−q0 extraction by a city in g0 such
that no source supplies more than −→q0 is possible in any inclusive subgraph of g0 that
contains c j . As g0 is an inclusive subgraph of itself, this will imply that such levels of
extraction is possible in g0.
We know that it is possible for the inclusive subgraph with city c j and the sources
Ng(c j ). Take an inclusive subgraph gk−1 of g0 that contains k − 1 cities including c j .
Suppose that such levels of extractions are possible in gk−1. Denote by Qgk−1 such a
possible amount of flows in gk−1.
Now take an inclusive subgraph gk of g0 that contains k cities, k − 1 which were
in gk−1 and a fixed city ck which was not in gk−1.
Assume that in gk, |Sˆk ||Cˆk | <
|Sˆ|
|Cˆ | . Then gk is a least inclusive subgraph of g0, which
is a contradiction.
Then, |Sˆk ||Cˆk | ≥
|Sˆ|
|Cˆ | . Take Qgk−1 which delivers
←−q0 to all cities in gk−1. As gk contains
gk−1 we can supply the cities in gk−1 with ←−q0 without exceeding outflow −→q0 in any
source. Now let ck extract through its links such that the outflow from each source in
Ng(ck) is −→q0 . If the total extraction of ck exceeds ←−q0 , then we are done.
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If not, denote by Q1 the flow vector for gk such that flows for the links which were
already in gk−1 equals to Qgk−1 , and the flows for the links which were not in gk−1
equals to 0. Now, given that ck /∈ Ck−1, let16 Q2 be the flow vector for gk such that
q2jk = −→q0 − q1i , for j ∈ Ng(ck)
q2jl = q1jl , for l = k
Since |Sˆk ||Cˆk | ≥
|Sˆ|
|Cˆ | , there must be a source si in gk not connected to ck , such that its
outflow in Q2 is strictly less than −→q0 . Let S−k be the set of sources in gk which not
connected to ck and which have outflows in Q2 strictly less than −→q0 .
S−k =
{
si ∈ Sk : si /∈ Ng(ck) and q2i < −→q0
}
Suppose that for any source si ∈ S−k and for all paths
P = {(si , c1), (c1, s1), . . . , (ct , st ), (st , ck)}
that connects si with ck , there exists (c j , s j ) ∈ P such that q2j j = 0. Given such a
path P , let sP denote the source sl such that (cl , sl) ∈ P, q2ll = 0 and there exists
no other source s j in P , closer to ck than sl such that (c j , s j ) ∈ P and q2j j = 0. Let
Ck = {c j ∈ Ck : there exists a path P from si to ck for some si ∈ S−k and in P, c j is
between sP and ck}. Then the inclusive subgraph with cities Ck ∪ ck is least inclusive
in gk , which is a contradiction.
Then there exists a source si ∈ S−k such that there exists a path
P = {(si , c1), (c1, s1), . . . , (ct , st ), (st , ck)}
that connects si with ck and min(c j ,s j )∈P q2j j = 0. Let
d = min
(c j ,s j )∈P
{q2j j , q2i }
Now, given such a path P , let Q3 be the flow vector for gk such that
q3i1 = q2i1 + d,
q3j j = q2j j − d,
q3j ( j+1) = q2j ( j+1) + d
q3tk = q2tk + d
q3ll ′ = q2ll ′ , for all other links (l, l ′)
16 The subscripts will be used as indices. Hence, for source si , q1i will denote its outflow at the vector Q1.
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It is possible to make ck extract at least ←−q0 by finding such paths from sources in Sˆ−k
to ck and changing the flows as explained above for each path from a source in Sˆ−k to
ck . If after using all such paths, ck could still not extract ←−q0 , then we could use the
reasoning above to get a contradiction.
Then the desired levels of extractions are possible in g0. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6 We will show that in a subgraph which has no least inclusive
subgraphs, at the efficient levels of extractions, every user have links with positive
marginal utility of extraction and no links with negative marginal utility of extraction.
Since the utilities are strictly concave in extractions, this implies the total extraction
for the efficient outcome is less than the equilibrium, where all marginal utilities are
zero.
Let g0 = 〈S0 ∪ C0, L0〉 be a subgraph which has no least inclusive subgraphs. The
efficient total extraction for each city and total outflow from each source in g0 are
respectively
←−q0 = αn0
γ n0 + 2βm0 and
−→q0 = αm0
γ n0 + 2βm0
Assume that n0 < m0. The efficient outflow from each source is equal. Then for any





γ n0 + 2βm0 > 0
Assume that m0 < n0. If some sources are shared, then m0 > 1. The subgraph has
no least inclusive subgraphs, hence each user has at least n0
m0
links. To achieve the
efficient levels, a city c j cannot extract more than αm0γ n0+2βm0 from a single source. If
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